A  Law & Personal Finance  View of Legal Origins Theory by Okamoto, Karl S.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2009 | Issue 6 Article 7
12-18-2009
A "Law & Personal Finance" View of Legal Origins
Theory
Karl S. Okamoto
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karl S. Okamoto, A "Law & Personal Finance" View of Legal Origins Theory, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1635 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2009/iss6/7
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:54 PM 
 
1635 
A “Law & Personal Finance” View of Legal Origins 
Theory 
Karl S. Okamoto 
In two seminal papers,1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (LLSV) spell out a 
theory for the interrelationship between law and economic 
development now commonly referred to as “Legal Origins Theory.” 
Legal Origins Theory makes the following claims: 
(1) There exist “legal families” that form separate and distinct 
sets of legal systems that are made up of groups of countries, viz., 
Common Law countries (primarily Anglo-Saxon nations), Germanic 
Civil Law countries (e.g., Germany and Japan), and French Civil 
Law countries (e.g., France and most of continental Europe).2 
(2) There is a significant correlation between a country’s “legal 
origin,” which group it belongs to, and the character of certain legal 
rules or procedures we find operating within that jurisdiction (e.g., 
judicial independence and contract enforcement, property right 
protection, minority shareholder protection, market vs. 
interventionist financial regulation, labor regulation, etc.).3 
(3) These rules operate to advance certain economic ends, with 
rules/procedures that tend to favor market-based, individual 
contracting versus statist regulatory regimes which yield superior 
 
  Director, Program in Business & Entrepreneurship Law and Associate Professor of 
Law, Earle Mack School of Law, Drexel University. B.A. 1982, J.D. 1985, Columbia 
University. 
 1. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. 
FIN. 1131 (1997). A decade later, three of the four authors provided a restatement of their 
theory. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et 
al., Economic Consequences]. 
 2. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 287–91 (describing the 
concept of “legal families”). 
 3. See id. at 291–92 (describing the links between group membership and types of 
legal rules and procedures). 
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outcomes based on certain measures, such as market capitalization to 
GDP, income per capita, and others.4 
(4) Membership in a legal family is exogenously determined 
(largely by the process of colonization and the 
assimilation/perpetuation of legal cultures by colonized 
jurisdictions). The distinct character of the broad legal families is a 
feature of history beginning as early as the middle ages and 
extending through the revolutionary era. Despite growing global 
convergence, these distinct characters persist and are significant; and 
these distinct characters are a significant antecedent cause of the 
types of legal rules/procedures found in a given country and, 
therefore, of the resulting economic consequences.5 
What makes Legal Origins Theory so interesting is its claim to be 
more than simply a set of results. It claims to offer prescriptive value 
for policy development.6 Beyond simply offering a descriptive 
narrative of what legal choices in the past have led to the economic 
consequences of today, it purports to offer ex ante a narrative on 
what economic consequences will arise tomorrow from legal 
conditions today. Put crudely, if we were to form a new country 
today, we would see future outcomes determined by which legal 
family our new country belongs. These outcomes would be 
consistent with what we have seen in the past. Or so the Theory 
holds.7 
This claim of inevitability may overstate, to some extent, the 
claims of the primary proponents of the Theory. Some have dubbed 
it the “strong form.”8 However, without some assertion of predictive 
value, the Theory becomes substantially less interesting. To say that 
certain good economic outcomes have come out of certain legal 
policies is, of course old beer. To be something more than another 
 
 4. See id. at 292–98 (reviewing the various empirical findings). 
 5. See id. at 306–09 (“[T]he empirical prediction of the Legal Origin Theory is that 
the differences between legal origins are deep enough that we observe them expressed . . . even 
after centuries of legal and regulatory evolution.”). 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 323–26 (describing Legal Origins Theory’s contribution to legal and 
regulatory reform). 
 7. See id. at 326 (“[L]egal origins . . . have significant consequences for the legal and 
regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.”). 
 8. See, e.g., John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh, 
The Legal Origins Hypothesis: What are We Learning from Time-Series Evidence, 2009 BYU L. 
Rev. 1435. The obvious allusion to the various forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis may 
indeed be telling. 
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in a long line of law and economics papers, “law & finance,” as some 
have labeled LLSV’s work, needs to find a “big truth.” And like any 
assertion of discovery of a big truth, no matter how modestly stated, 
the assertions of Legal Origins Theory have attracted critics.9 I would 
join their ranks. 
There are two aspects to Legal Origins Theory that I find the 
most difficult to accept. Professors Aguilera and Williams’ paper10 
highlights one, Professor Fairfax’s,11 the other. 
The first feature I struggle with is the notion in the Theory that 
because we have found a causal channel that is significant ex post, we 
therefore have a predictive tool that allows us to set policy ex ante. 
LLSV revisited their theory in conjunction with the tenth anniversary 
of the publication of their first papers.12 In their tour of the empire 
they had built, they purport to offer some humility regarding the 
predictive power of their work. Nevertheless, they conclude that 
legal origins have significant consequences for economic outcomes, 
and that the outcomes associated with the common law “family” are 
superior.13 All of this, despite an acknowledged inability to explain 
why France is a nice place to live.14  
 
 9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the 
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 59–71 (2001) (arguing that 
legal origins are not determinative of the development of deep capital markets); Raghuram G. 
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 
Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (arguing that financial development is better 
explained by the ability of powerful incumbents to prevent openness in the marketplace to 
prevent competition); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006) (post-war politics offers a better explanation than legal origins). 
Perhaps the least contestable lesson from Legal Origins Theory is one about academic strategy. 
If you have a choice in presenting your idea or your data results in an interesting but modest 
way or as a “big idea” with an aura of inevitability and great truth to it, pick the latter. Short of 
four letter words in your title, it is the most likely way to get you the download count you are 
looking for and the status of “academic rock stars,” as Professors Aguilera and Williams put it. 
Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete and 
Important, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413, 1420. 
 10. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9. 
 11. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1571. 
 12. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1. 
 13. Id. at 327 (“[O]ur framework suggests that the common law approach . . . performs 
better than the civil law approach.”). 
 14. Id. at 302 (“[C]ountries like France and Belgium achieved high living standards 
despite their legal origin.”). 
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I cannot help but wonder if the world can really be that simple. 
In a future that does not include two World Wars,15 in which men 
like Brandeis and Landis16 do not live in the times that these men 
lived, in a world where portfolio theory already exists and where 
globalization has become rampant and capital has become truly 
stateless, do the causal channels we discern for what has happened 
continue to exist in order to repeat what will happen again? Is it 
possible that the kind of historical events and figures that historians 
labor to elucidate can be so simply washed over by the ineluctable 
force of Legal Origins?17 
Professors Aguilera and Williams’ notion of equifinality18 
captures the point well. The potential explanations are so varied and 
the interactions and path dependencies so complex, it simply defies 
belief that a set of regressions on a crudely defined “small-n” sample 
of “legal families” can be the basis for worldwide economic policy.19 
We must allow complexity back into the narrative. Contingent 
details like the strength of labor movements, the presence of foreign 
investors, or the effects of war will matter.20 In a complex global 
economy, where “New Multinationals”21 roam and arbitrage across 
borders is the name of the game, nation-state regimes are going to 
be under severe pressure, and, in my opinion, they will 
homogenize.22 Cross-country studies provide a very powerful tool 
for policy analysis—they always have. But like the language in the 
 
 15. See Roe, supra note 9 (arguing that the differing experiences of various nations in 
the aftermath of World War II offer a better explanation for the varying approaches to 
economic regulation).  
 16. Whatever one may say about the “great man” theory of history, it is difficult to 
ignore the impact of individual events and individual persons on the development of the laws 
that shape economic history. See generally THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 
(1984) (describing the contributions of Louis Brandeis and James Landis in the development 
of the administrative state in the United States). 
 17. LLSV acknowledge that “[p]erhaps the most difficult challenge to the  
hypothesis . . . has been posed by historical arguments.” La Porta et al., Economic 
Consequences, supra note 1, at 315. Nevertheless, LLSV have been adept at fitting historical 
counter-examples within their framework. See, e.g., id. at 315–23. 
 18. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1416 (“[T]here are multiple paths to any 
given outcome.”). 
 19. Id. at 1414 (calling the groupings of legal families “rather narrow”). 
 20. Id. at 1415–16. 
 21. Id. at 1422 (describing the rise of the borderless enterprise as “the strongest 
robustness test to refute the hypothesis”). 
 22. LLSV acknowledge this trend. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 
1, at 327 (“There are many arguments for convergence.”). 
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front of a typical prospectus states, “past performance is no 
guarantee of future results.” Of course, we can only begin with past 
patterns to build our models. Many “smaller” LLSV projects—I like 
the ones about judicial independence, flexibility, and contract 
enforcement—have yielded a wealth of insights. But I agree with 
Professors Aguilera and Williams that the models will be more useful 
if they can embrace complexity.23 That is certainly one lesson I take 
from our current crisis—it is the unexpected that often matters the 
most.24 
The second aspect of Legal Origins Theory I find hard to accept 
is its malleability. For example, I find less than convincing how 
LLSV’s 2008 paper argued that the rise of the U.S. regulatory state 
following the Depression—a highly statutory and interventionist 
regime in my opinion—was, in fact, actually an act consistent with 
the common law tradition and a free market bent.25 I can easily agree 
that the New Deal legislation reflected “strategies intended to 
rehabilitate and support markets, not to replace them.”26 But in 
doing so, what happens to the distinction between civil and common 
law styles? When does the creation of an administrative 
infrastructure, like the one we witnessed in the New Deal, stray from 
being a market-friendly, common law solution, to being a civil law, 
“state solution” that seeks to replace market forces? Similarly, 
Professor Fairfax’s struggle to situate the United States government’s 
recent responses to the financial crisis reveals another example of the 
indeterminacy of the labels used by LLSV.  
To pick one example addressed by Professor Fairfax, consider the 
governmental response to the crisis at the nation’s banks. On the one 
hand, Professor Fairfax notes that the level of control taken by the 
Federal Reserve and the United States Treasury smacks of the kind of 
“nationalization” one associates with the statist approaches of civil 
law governments. As Professor Fairfax states, citing LLSV, “[t]he 
quintessential hallmark of a civil law system—and thus one of its 
 
 23. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1424 (looking for “more nuanced” 
institutional analyses). 
 24. See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE 
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007). 
 25. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 308–09 (while 
acknowledging that the response was highly statutory and administrative, arguing that its 
essence was consistent with the common law’s pro-market character).  
 26. Id. at 308. 
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primary tools—is control of the banking system.”27 Yet, only a few 
pages later, Professor Fairfax is forced to concede that “the 
characterization of America’s relationship with banks as 
nationalization appears to be exaggerated.”28 She points out that the 
government has gone to great lengths to structure its “bailout” of 
the banking system on terms that approximate private, market 
transactions.29  
Generally, Professor Fairfax attempts to argue that the recent 
governmental response to the financial crisis is inconsistent with the 
predictions of the Legal Origins Theory. She argues that its features 
favor legislative or regulatory action30 over judicial processes,31 and 
that they are marked by a stark growth in administrative authority.32 
My suspicion is that LLSV would have no hesitation in reaching an 
opposite conclusion. Just as they felt able to explain the 
administrative state that arose in response to the Depression, I doubt 
they would have much difficulty in characterizing this last spate of 
government intervention in the markets as utterly consistent with 
their predictions. Professor Fairfax herself ends by concluding that 
“what emerges is a potentially mixed story.”33 But if legal rules can 
be characterized so easily as one or the other—which I think they 
can—does this belie the premise of LLSV’s analysis? 
In the end, however, I, like LLSV themselves,34 believe the 
greatest challenge to Legal Origins Theory’s claim to big truth status 
must come from a more plausible, historical retelling of their story of 
cause and effect. I give you only a quick sketch of one explanation 
that appeals to me. I am going to call this the “Law & Personal 
Finance” School of Legal Origins Theory. 
One challenge faced by every individual, and collectively by every 
society, is the management of what I visualize as a lifetime of cash 
flows. Over a lifetime, each of us sits at the center of a series of 
flows—money in and money out. As newborns we need cash for our 
sustenance, health, etc. We need cash for education, for shelter, and 
 
 27. Fairfax, supra note 11, at 1608. 
 28. Id. at 1613. 
 29. Id. at 1613–14. 
 30. Id. at 1603–05. 
 31. Id. at 1612–13. 
 32. Id. at 1606–08. 
 33. Id. at 1617. 
 34. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 315. 
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so on. As we enter adulthood, we start to begin to bring cash in 
through earnings and, ultimately, through investment returns. Our 
challenge, however we may source or use these cash flows, is to have 
net cash flow equal to or exceeding zero over a lifetime and to 
maintain the required liquidity along the way that allows us to match 
in and out flows as they arise.35 That’s what savings and its corollary, 
borrowings, are for. 
Now, recent events have highlighted two problems. First, many 
people in our society will not succeed in achieving a positive net 
lifetime cash flow without substantially changing their lifestyles or 
receiving outside help, and, second, many people today cannot solve 
the liquidity puzzle.36 While these problems have been looming in 
the United States for some time, the crash in various asset markets 
has brought these issues to the point of crisis. 
So, what does this have to do with Legal Origins Theory? Well, I 
see an answer in the concept of “equity culture.” Equity culture is a 
phrase we once saw all the time in the early 1990s when American 
investment firms began assessing their global expansion priorities. A 
country like the United Kingdom, and more recently India,37 was 
seen as promising investment territory because of its strong “equity 
cultures.” Nordic countries were also seen as promising (although 
less so). Countries like Germany,38 and especially France,39 were 
distinctly less attractive despite the size of their economies because of 
their “lack” of an “equity culture.” You will no doubt notice the 
 
 35. My favorite discussion of this challenge is found in JOE DOMINGUEZ & VICKI 
ROBIN, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE (1992). 
 36. See, e.g., S. Mitra Kalita, The ‘Democratization’ of Credit is Over—Now It’s Payback 
Time, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB125511860883676713.html (describing the over-leveraging by consumers and the impact 
of tightening credit). 
 37. See, e.g., Nandini Lakshman, Private Equity Invades India, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 8, 
2007, at 40 (reporting on the influx of private equity investment into India). 
 38. See, e.g., John Eisenhammer, View from Frankfurt: Learning How to Be Held to 
Account, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 15, 1994, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
business/view-from-frankfurt-learning-how-to-be-held-to-account-john-eisenhammer-atches-
german-companies-try-to-cope-with-sharp-changes-to-share-trading-laws-1376584.html 
(“The explanation lies in the fact that Germany is a different economy, one shaped by the 
relative lack of a dynamic investor culture. . . . Only recently, Rolf Breuer, chairman of the 
German Stock Exchange and a board member of Deutsche Bank, bemoaned the lack of an 
equity culture.”); Phillip Moore, Franz Takes to Equities, At Last, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1994, at 
83 (describing the rise of an equity culture in Germany). 
 39. See, e.g., Anne Swardson, Cultivating a Taste for French Stocks, WASH. POST, Nov. 
17, 1999, at E1 (describing the lack of an equity culture in France). 
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confluence between Legal Origins Theory’s map of “legal families” 
and this “equity culture” geography. They are the same. 
Broadly put, “equity culture” measures the degree to which the 
investing public participates directly in risk capital markets.40 In other 
words, to return to my story of lifetime cash flows, high equity 
cultures are markets where individuals attempt to solve their cash 
flow challenge by converting excess labor returns into risk capital 
returns by investing in equities.41 Common law countries, like the 
United States and Great Britain, have high equity cultures; civil law 
countries, like France, do not. So, do Legal Origins drive equity 
cultures? LLSV certainly suggest that they drive the rules that one 
would expect where equity culture flourishes. 
But I am not convinced of the causal connection between Legal 
Origin and equity culture. In a world where cash flows travel with 
increasing ease across borders, why would we expect rules in one 
jurisdiction to affect demand (as opposed, perhaps, to supply) for 
equity investments? In other words, legal rules have more to say 
about what investment vehicles may be offered in a given 
jurisdiction, not necessarily about which investments savers in that 
jurisdiction choose to make.42 Since savers can access investment 
opportunities on a global basis, the rules of the jurisdiction in which 
they happen to live do not affect their choice, but rather, simply 
what kind of local options are available.43 Equity culture, on the 
other hand, is about demand; it is about the choice individuals make 
in solving the cash flow problem. 
 
 40. See Michael Haliassos & Christis Hassapis, Equity Culture and Household Behavior, 
54 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 719 (2002) (describing the spread of equity culture in Western 
Europe). 
 41. Interestingly, recent studies suggest individuals are not successful in using the equity 
markets for building wealth. See, e.g., Yannis Bilias, Dimitirs Georgarakos & Michael Haliassos, 
Equity Culture and the Distribution of Wealth (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 
2005/20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=731805. 
 42. In fact, much of the debate about regulation of financial markets before the recent 
crisis centered on the impact of regulation on the competitiveness of U.S. equity markets and 
on the global scene. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for 
Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008) (describing the proliferation of equity 
markets around the globe as creating a new market for regulation). 
 43. Another study makes a similar point in finding that parties to agreements that elect 
international arbitration as their mode of dispute resolution do not shun French law or favor 
common law to the degree that LLSV would suggest. Stefan Voigt, Are International 
Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory (working paper, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982202. In other words, Legal Origins Theory 
does not explain the parties’ demand for law of different legal families.  
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This leads me to posit a different possibility. How does law affect 
demand rather than supply? I will propose two ways by which this 
may occur. One that I believe is only marginally important and the 
other counter-intuitive. Marginally important are taxes.44 I say 
marginally because I suspect whatever choices any one jurisdiction 
makes to favor or disfavor equity through taxation can be arbitraged 
away by sophisticated investors.  
The other, potentially more important, factor is a country’s 
approach to social welfare. This coincides with Mark Roe’s45 and 
others’ political explanations, but is different in its locus of 
operation. This is not a battle between labor and elites. This is a 
battle between state and market-based finance.  
In countries where education, healthcare, and retirement—the 
terrible trio of personal finance—are guaranteed by the state, in 
other words, where the state takes on the management of lifetime 
cash flow through taxation and subsidy, individuals can afford to 
shun the risk associated with equities.46 As a friend once put it, “it’s 
like work—why do it if you don’t have to?” Instead, they favor cash, 
bonds, and hard assets. In countries where the safety net of state-
based social welfare programs are weak, the need to overcome 
inflation and generate positive real returns to fund real future cash 
needs, like education, healthcare, and retirement, leads those who do 
save (and that’s another problem) to invest in equities.47  
 
 44. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Ayers, C. Bryan Cloyd & John R. Robinson, “Read  
My Lips . . .”: Does the Tax Rhetoric of Presidential Candidates Affect Security Prices, 48 J.L. & 
ECON. 125 (2005) (finding that securities prices are impacted by changing market 
expectations regarding tax rates); Sandra Renfro Callaghan & Christopher B. Barry, Tax-
Induced Trading of Equity Securities: Evidence from the ADR Market, 58 J. FIN. 1583 (2003) 
(finding that taxes on dividend income affect trading patterns around ex-dividend dates); 
Robert E. Hall & Dale W. Jorgenson, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 391 (1967) (finding that tax policy impacts the level and timing of firm-level 
investments). 
 45. Roe, supra note 9.  
 46. You might argue that having a social safety net should allow individuals to take 
greater risk in their portfolios. This assumes, however, that individuals pursue wealth 
maximization as their investment goal rather than need satisfaction. 
 47. One recent paper comes to a similar conclusion, finding that the choice of state-
based versus private pension funding is explained by antecedent inflationary shocks that have 
the effect of depleting the savings of the middle class. These shocks lead to a political 
preference for redistributive, publicly funded solutions. See Enrico Perotti & Armin 
Schwienbacher, The Political Origin of Pension Funding (working paper, Mar. 31, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957752. 
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So, what does this mean for our assessment of Legal Origins 
Theory? Well, like Professor Fairfax’s retelling of the current 
regulatory response, this parallel narrative can be fit within the 
traditional Legal Origins story.  
The general notion, that common law families tend to offer 
market-based solutions, is consistent with the description of the 
conditions likely to cause demand for equity. Also, the tendency to 
interventionist solutions does jibe with the high social welfare culture 
that leads to low equity demand. This parallel narrative also fits 
within the prescriptive narrative of LLSV by linking equity culture 
with economic growth. Equity culture certainly leads to larger and 
more dispersed capital markets, by definition. The availability of risk 
capital should also decrease the cost of capital, thus increasing 
investment and economic growth. The relative strength of venture 
capital in the Anglo-American world and its consequences for 
economic activity might be cited also (although I am not sure this 
fairly takes account of other forms of “venture” finance in, say, the 
Mittlestand in Germany or the “entrepreneur” communities in 
Italy).48 Overall, you can see how we might fit this alternative 
narrative of “equity cultures” into the Theory’s prediction of 
superior economic outcomes for common law countries. 
The explanatory efficacy of “equity culture” with regard to 
economic growth would fit nicely into the Theory’s predictive 
power, except for the one most glaring lesson I see in our current 
travails—leaving individuals and markets to solve the problem of 
lifetime cash flow does not look like it is going to work. They are not 
up to it. Enter here all the behavioral economists and the like.49 But 
whatever the explanation—personally I’m happy with “it’s simply 
very hard”—people systematically fail. And so the question then 
becomes how to fix this. I would suggest that much of the mess we 
are in today stems from the market’s attempt to develop structures 
that are intended (genuinely or cynically) to address the problem of 
lifetime cash flows. It is what drives demand for so-called absolute 
return strategies. It lies at the center of securitization. It is what 
 
 48. Professors Aguilera and Williams also note the ongoing debate over the performance 
of family-owned businesses. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1419 (“[T]he jury is still out 
. . . on whether family-owned firms perform worse . . . .”). 
 49. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government 
Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2000) (arguing that government may be complicit in 
creating an irrational faith in the equities as a savings device). 
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hedge funds, variable annuities, esoteric mortgages, etc. offer. It is a 
problem that can, in the end, only be solved by somebody investing 
in risk capital. The question is who? Individuals? The government? 
Or maybe something in between? LLSV seems to say that the only 
good answer is the common law’s preference for “individuals and 
markets.” Recent history, on the other hand, seems to suggest that 
the answer may not be so simple. We should hesitate whenever the 
simplification that often comes with a purported “big truth” asks us 
to ignore the messiness we so often see around us. 
For all of its explanatory power ex post, I, like Professor Fairfax 
and Professors Aguilar and Williams, am not sure Legal Origins 
Theory has much to contribute to finding the right answers going 
forward for how we should organize our economic institutions. The 
recent crisis has certainly raised some doubt as to the ineluctable 
superiority of unregulated markets. Perhaps more fundamentally, it 
has caused some of us to re-examine the assumptions that underlie 
our definitions of success. Our faith in the linkage between financial 
markets and well-being has been shaken. To return to my story of 
life-time cash flow, we will ask again whether a society should 
measure success by how wealthy it becomes or perhaps rather by 
how many of its members do in fact achieve a positive lifetime cash 
flow. As Professors Aguilera and Williams point out, different 
measures of success—like measuring more than growth in financial 
markets—often yield outcomes quite contrary to the LLSV analysis.50 
While it is interesting to consider what role legal origins played in 
how we became what we are, it is much more important to consider 
now whether we continue to want to remain the same. I do not see 











 50. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1433 (“[T]he debates over the superiority of 
different capitalist systems of economic organization should not be considered over.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2010 7:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1646 
 
 
 
 
